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CASE COMMENTARIES 
CORPORATIONS & SECURITIES 
Shareholder-proposed bylaws must not require a corporation’s board of  
directors to breach its fiduciary duties or to violate state or federal laws.  CA, 
Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
By Melanie Prince 
Any shareholder-proposed bylaw that might require a Delaware corporation’s 
board of  directors to breach fiduciary duties or violate other laws cannot be included 
in proxy materials for a shareholder vote, even if  the proposed bylaw would 
otherwise be an appropriate subject for shareholder action.  As owners of  a 
corporation, shareholders generally have the power under applicable state law and 
corporation documents to amend, modify, or repeal the corporation’s bylaws.  
Delaware General Corporation Law permits shareholder bylaw proposals provided 
that the bylaw does not encroach upon the management authority of  the board of  
directors.  Therefore, shareholders can generally only attempt to impose process-
related bylaws that do not impact the board’s ability to manage the corporation’s daily 
affairs.  However, a bylaw that is procedural in nature but would cause the board to 
violate the law is not permissible.  If  the shareholder proposal involves a bylaw that 
could require the board of  directors to breach fiduciary duties to the corporation, 
the proposal must not be included in the proxy materials or brought to a vote at the 
shareholder meeting.  The Delaware Supreme Court resolved these important issues 
surrounding shareholder bylaw proposals in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension 
Plan. 
CA, Inc. (“CA”) is a business incorporated under Delaware law with a 12-
member board of  directors.  All board members are eligible for reelection each year.  
CA’s 2008 annual stockholder meeting was scheduled for September 9, 2008, and CA 
planned to file final proxy materials with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) by July 24, 2008.  A CA stockholder, AFSCME Employees Pension Plan 
(“AFSCME”), sent a proposed bylaw to be included in CA’s proxy materials for the 
2008 stockholder meeting.  The bylaw would have required the board of  directors to 
reimburse an individual or group stockholder for any reasonable expenses associated 
with the nomination of  a candidate to the board of  directors, provided that one of  
the nominees was elected to the board.  Upon receipt of  the materials for this 
proposal, CA desired to exclude the information from its proxy materials and 
requested a “no-action letter” from the SEC, claiming that the bylaw was an 
inappropriate subject for a shareholder proposal and would force the corporation to 
violate Delaware corporate law if  enacted.  Both parties submitted legal opinions 
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supporting their respective positions, resulting in a conflict under Delaware law.  The 
SEC promptly certified two questions of  law to the Delaware Supreme Court for 
resolution, to be decided de novo: 
1. Is the AFSCME Proposal a proper subject for action by shareholders as a 
matter of  Delaware law? 
2. Would the AFSCME Proposal, if  adopted, cause CA to violate Delaware 
law? 
The court first established that Delaware corporate law gives both the board 
of  directors and stockholders the ability to adopt, modify or repeal bylaws.  
However, this concurrent power in title 8, section 109(a) of  the Delaware Code is 
limited by section 141(a), which gives the board of  directors direct management 
authority to the exclusion of  stockholders.  AFSCME’s proposal facially limited 
director authority; however, some limitations are still permissible and within the 
scope of  stockholder authority to adopt and modify bylaws.  Procedural limitations, 
such as requiring a certain number of  directors on the board or prohibiting board 
action outside of  meetings, are examples of  bylaws that would not usurp the board’s 
statutory management authority.  Thus, the first question concerns the nature of  the 
proposed bylaw—specifically, is the bylaw substantive in that it restricts board power 
over management responsibilities, or is it primarily procedural and therefore a 
permissible limitation on board power?  The court discussed the wording of  the 
bylaw and acknowledged that it appeared to be a substantive restriction on board 
authority.  The language alone is not sufficient to determine the true nature of  the 
bylaw, however; the essential purpose and context of  the bylaw are also important 
considerations.  The shareholders have an interest in the election of  directors as 
owners of  the corporation, and the bylaw would give shareholders greater ability and 
opportunity to nominate new and different candidates for directorships by providing 
for reimbursement of  expenses incurred in that process.  The shareholders should 
have input and power in the director election process, and the fact that the board 
would be required to reimburse nominating shareholders or shareholder groups from 
corporate funds does not automatically make the shareholder proposal substantive 
and improper.  The court concluded that AFSCME’s bylaw was in essence 
procedural because it intended to control part of  the director election process and 
was within the authority granted to the shareholders.  Therefore, the proposed bylaw 
was an appropriate shareholder proposal.   
After determining that AFSCME’s proposal was proper, the court turned to 
the second question posed by the SEC.  The court recognized the need to assess the 
proposed bylaw under many different potential scenarios to determine if  its 
application could violate any relevant laws.  The court determined that the bylaw 
could potentially cause a violation.  In at least one circumstance, the board would be 
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required to reimburse a shareholder or group of  shareholders involved in the 
nomination process in violation of  title 8, section 141(a) of  the Delaware Code, 
which prohibits breaches of  fiduciary duty.  As examples, the court noted that a 
competitor who was also a shareholder could nominate a group of  individuals to 
director positions with the sole purpose of  obtaining the corporation’s proprietary 
information for the competitor; more generally, director nominations by 
shareholders might be motivated by personal, frivolous, or improper purposes that 
would not further the interests of  the corporation.  If  the board was required to 
reimburse shareholders for improperly-motivated nominations, the reimbursements 
would result in a breach of  fiduciary duty if  the payments were at odds with CA’s 
best interests.  
To support these assertions, the court referenced prior cases involving 
corporations that voluntarily entered into contracts that encroached on their boards’ 
exercise of  fiduciary duties.  The court invalidated those contracts because of  the 
potential for breaches of  fiduciary duty, and in the present case, the court refused to 
validate a shareholder proposal that could similarly result in a breach of  fiduciary 
duty.  The fact that the proposed bylaw would take the power to reimburse funds for 
nomination expenses completely out of  the board’s scope of  authority does not 
excuse the possible statutory violation that would occur.  The board’s remaining 
authority to decide the amount of  reimbursement did not provide enough power to 
negate the possible fiduciary duty breach.  The court held that the board must be 
allowed to fully deny reimbursement when appropriate to protect the corporation’s 
interest, and the proposed bylaw did not provide that option.  While shareholders do 
have power to amend or modify bylaws with procedural changes that do not affect 
board authority over management decisions, the bylaw proposals must not have the 
potential to require the board to violate applicable laws. 
The court ruled that the bylaw as drafted must be rejected, but commented 
that AFSCME could seek recourse by attempting to amend CA’s Certificate of  
Incorporation or requesting modification of  existing law.  The proposed bylaw was 
an appropriate subject for shareholder action because it was procedural rather than 
substantive in effect and context, but the application of  the bylaw as drafted could 
require the board to breach fiduciary duties to the corporation.  This potential 
violation of  Delaware corporation law prevented the inclusion of  AFSCME’s 
proposal in CA’s proxy materials for the 2008 shareholder meeting. 
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan offers guidance to shareholders 
attempting to amend or modify a Delaware corporation’s bylaws.  Shareholders 
should draft proposed bylaws carefully and consider several issues.  First, bylaws 
must be procedural in nature.  Second, it is important to note that language alone 
does not determine whether a proposed bylaw is substantive or procedural.  If  
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challenged, courts will also consider the effect of  the bylaw as implemented and the 
context and subject of  the bylaw.  Therefore, shareholders should consider both the 
language and effect during the drafting process.  Third, it may be useful for 
shareholders to assess many possible applications of  the bylaw to ensure that the 
proposed bylaw does not impermissibly limit the board’s authority or restrict board 
power such that the bylaw could compel the board to violate corporation law.  
Taking these steps during the drafting process may prevent the corporation from 
attempting to dismiss the proposal from inclusion in proxy materials and requesting 
a “no-action” letter from the SEC.  The steps could also prevent litigation on issues 
similar to those presented in the case at hand, which turned somewhat on the fact 
that the bylaw’s language did not allow the board to comply with fiduciary duty 
responsibilities under all circumstances.  Shareholders still have latitude and power to 
attempt to modify corporation bylaws, but the proposals must be drafted with 
attention to many important issues to be successful in passing the corporation and 
SEC gatekeepers to reach the shareholders at large.  
――――― 
Retaining corporate assets exceeding secured claims may jeopardize the 
corporate veil.  Pamperin v. Streamline MFG., Inc., No. M2007-00256-COA-R3-CV, 
2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 154, 2008 WL 695865 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2008). 
By Stephen D. Hargraves 
While corporate shareholders are not personally liable for the acts or debts 
of  the corporation, the shareholders may become personally liable due to their own 
acts or conduct.  In Pamperin v. Streamline MFG., Inc., the Court of  Appeals of  
Tennessee addressed whether a shareholder’s retention of  assets from a liquidating 
corporation—for personal gain—should make the shareholder personally liable if  
the value of  those assets exceeds the value of  the shareholder’s secured claims. 
In Pamperin, the plaintiff  purchased a hot tub from Streamline 
Manufacturing, Inc. (“Streamline”) with a $3,000 down payment.  At the time of  the 
transaction, Streamline’s two sole shareholders, Mr. Moore and Mr. Holt, were 
involved in litigation concerning control of  the company.  After the plaintiff  made 
the down payment, but before the plaintiff  received the hot tub, a jury determined 
that Mr. Holt held a security interest in all of  Streamline’s assets and could foreclose 
on the collateral if  necessary.  A court order entered in that case provided that 
Streamline would redeem Mr. Moore’s equity interest in the company, Mr. Holt 
would receive all the company’s assets, and Streamline would cease to operate.  After 
taking possession of  all Streamline’s assets, Mr. Holt sold the real property to satisfy 
his personal debts and employed Streamline’s personal property in his new hot tub 
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manufacturing business.  Mr. Holt paid some of  Streamline’s debts (primarily those 
owed to vendors he wished to continue doing business with through his new 
company), but the plaintiff  was informed that her hot tub would not be delivered 
and her down payment would not be refunded. 
Upon learning of  Mr. Holt’s intent to keep her down payment, the plaintiff  
filed a lawsuit in general sessions court against Streamline, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Moore.  
The court entered judgment against Streamline, but it dismissed the claims against 
Mr. Moore and Mr. Holt.  The plaintiff  then appealed to the circuit court and sought 
to “pierce the corporate veil” to hold Mr. Moore and Mr. Holt personally liable as 
Streamline’s sole shareholders.  The circuit court entered a judgment against the 
corporation of  $17,663.52, which included treble damages and attorney’s fees 
pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.  However, the court refused to 
pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on either Mr. Moore or Mr. Holt. 
On appeal, the Court of  Appeals of  Tennessee was presented with the single 
issue of  whether the corporate veil should be pierced under the unique facts of  the 
case.  The court noted that under Tennessee corporate law, a corporation and its 
shareholders are viewed as distinct entities.  The separate legal status given to a 
corporation protects its shareholders from direct responsibility for the corporation’s 
debts and other liabilities, except in rare circumstances when a plaintiff  is successful 
in persuading a court to pierce the corporate veil.   
The most common factors used by Tennessee courts to determine whether 
to pierce the corporate veil are: (1) whether there was a failure to collect paid-in-
capital; (2) whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized; (3) the nonissuance 
of  stock certificates; (4) the sole ownership of  stock by one individual; (5) the use of  
the same office or business location; (6) the employment of  the same employees or 
attorneys; (7) the use of  the corporation as an instrumentality or business conduit 
for an individual or another corporation; (8) the diversion of  corporate assets by or 
to a stockholder or other entity to the detriment of  creditors, or the manipulation of  
assets and liabilities in another; (9) the use of  the corporation as a subterfuge in 
illegal transactions; (10) the formation and use of  the corporation to transfer to it the 
existing liability of  another person or entity; and (11) the failure to maintain arms 
length relationships among related entities.  The court noted that no one factor is 
conclusive in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.   
Applying the foregoing criteria to the facts in Pamperin, the court found that 
with regard to Mr. Moore, there was no misconduct that would justify holding him 
personally liable to Streamline’s creditors.  The court highlighted that Mr. Moore was 
never in total control of  the company and that Mr. Moore was eventually removed as 
a director and officer and divested of  all shares of  Streamline stock.  With regard to 
268 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 10
 
Mr. Holt, the evidence showed that all of  the assets of  the corporation were 
distributed to Mr. Holt in order to satisfy the security interest and mortgages held by 
Mr. Holt.  However, many of  the assets that were distributed to Mr. Holt were used 
for his own personal benefit, to the detriment of  Streamline and its other creditors.   
Article 9 of  the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth specific duties of  
secured parties when a debtor defaults on a secured debt.  The secured party is 
required to make a “commercially reasonable disposition” of  collateral.  Where a 
secured debt is over-collateralized, after applying the cash proceeds to certain 
obligations, the secured party should account to and pay a debtor for any surplus.   
In Pamperin, Mr. Holt did not account for any surplus in the assets that were 
listed as collateral securing Streamline’s original obligation.  Rather, he simply took 
title to all Streamline’s assets.  The facts clearly showed that some collateral remained 
after Mr. Holt’s secured obligations were satisfied.  Instead of  returning the surplus 
to Streamline, Mr. Holt personally retained all the personal property and used it in a 
new business for his own personal gain.  If  the remaining assets (or the value of  the 
collateral that exceeded the amount of  the original obligation) had been returned to 
Streamline, the plaintiff  might have enforced her contract claim and judgment 
against those assets in Streamline’s hands.  However, Streamline was instead made 
insolvent by Mr. Holt when he retained all of  Streamline’s personal property rather 
than only retaining an amount sufficient to satisfy the debt owed to him. 
As such, the court found that Mr. Holt had used his position as the sole 
remaining shareholder to abuse the corporate form and defraud Streamline’s other 
creditors, including the plaintiff.  Also, because Streamline’s assets were diverted to 
Mr. Holt’s own personal use, Streamline became unable to fulfill its existing 
obligations to creditors and others.  Therefore, the court held that in order to 
accomplish justice under the case’s unique facts, it was necessary to pierce the 
corporate veil in order to reach Mr. Holt. 
In Pamperin, the court held that where a shareholder receives a corporation’s 
assets pursuant to a security interest but uses surplus assets for personal gain to the 
detriment of  other creditors, that the shareholder will be personally liable to 
corporate creditors.  A transactional lawyer should advise shareholders, officers, and 
directors who are foreclosing on security interests in corporate assets to make a 
commercially reasonable disposition of  their collateral so as to avoid jeopardizing the 
corporate veil.   
――――― 
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
An employer has a duty to provide reasonable accommodations if the 
employer knew or should have known of an employee’s disability, even if the 
employee fails to request such accommodations.  Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008). 
By Christie M. Weaver 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), an employer must offer 
reasonable accommodations to assist a disabled employee in performing the essential 
duties of his or her job.  Historically, the employee has had the responsibility of 
notifying their employer of the need for an accommodation.  However, in Brady v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that an employer must offer reasonable accommodations if an employee’s disability 
is obvious or known, even if that employee does not request accommodations. 
Patrick S. Brady, a nineteen-year-old with cerebral palsy, had two years of 
work experience in a pharmacy prior to seeking employment as a “Salesfloor 
Associate” in a Wal-Mart pharmacy department in Centereach, New York.  When he 
applied, Brady signed a consent form stating that he was able to lift 50 pounds and 
could move up and down a ladder “either with or without an accommodation.”  
Brady’s cerebral palsy impacted all aspects of his life, resulting in slower speech, poor 
vision, and a slowed and limped walk.  Brady’s supervisor in the pharmacy 
department, a co-defendant, immediately recognized his disability. The supervisor 
expressed dissatisfaction with Brady’s job performance, and told Brady to “speed it 
up.”  When the supervisor failed to contact Brady with his work schedule, Brady 
called the store and the supervisor asked if he would be willing to work in another 
department.  At the supervisor’s request, the store manager transferred Brady out of 
the pharmacy.  Brady was sent to the parking lot, where he was instructed to collect 
and transport shopping carts, a task made difficult by his cerebral palsy.  Later, Brady 
was transferred to the food department and was ordered to stock shelves.  When the 
Wal-Mart issued a work schedule that conflicted with his community college 
schedule, Brady became frustrated and terminated his employment.   
Brady sued Wal-Mart for discrimination, alleging violations of the ADA and 
New York Human Rights Law, and asserting that the Wal-Mart’s actions amounted 
to constructive dismissal.  The trial court found that Brady was disabled under the 
ADA and that the Wal-Mart had discriminated against Brady on the basis of his 
disability by transferring him to the parking lot.  The court further held that the Wal-
Mart had made inappropriate pre-employment health inquiries, created a hostile 
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work environment, and failed to reasonably accommodate Brady’s disability.  
However, the court found that Brady had not been constructively dismissed or 
subjected to intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
The Wal-Mart appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The 
court affirmed the trial court’s denials of the Wal-Mart’s requests for judgment as a 
matter of law in relation to the issues of the existence of Brady’s disability, the Wal-
Mart’s failure to provide accommodations, the admission of a consent decree into 
evidence, and punitive damages.  The court found that sufficient evidence was 
presented to show that Brady was disabled under the ADA and that he was in fact 
perceived as disabled by the Wal-Mart.  Additionally, the Court affirmed the jury’s 
decision that Brady’s transfer from the pharmacy to the parking lot (and later to the 
food department) amounted to an adverse employment action and was thus 
discriminatory.  Although the transfer did not affect Brady’s income or job benefits, 
the parking lot and food department positions were considered to be “less 
distinguished” positions that involved “significantly diminished material 
responsibilities.” 
The trial court found that the Wal-Mart’s question concerning Brady’s 
abilities to carry fifty pounds and climb a ladder violated the rule that pre-
employment inquiries must be narrowly tailored to the specific job for which the 
applicant is applying.  The Wal-Mart asserted on appeal that Brady had no standing 
to claim that the pre-employment health inquiries were discriminatory because he 
had responded affirmatively to the questions and was hired.  The court 
acknowledged the difficulty of the issue, but refused to make a determination 
because a decision would not affect the damages awarded to Brady.  The trial court 
assigned all compensatory damages to the state law claims and the jury attributed 
punitive damages (later reduced to the statutory maximum) to the discrimination 
claims.  Thus, none of the damages awarded were associated with the Wal-Mart’s 
pre-employment inquiries. 
The most significant issue on appeal involved the Wal-Mart’s failure to 
accommodate Brady’s disability.  The Wal-Mart argued that there was no duty to 
provide accommodations because Brady neither requested an accommodation nor 
personally believed he needed an accommodation.  Under the ADA, an employer 
must provide reasonable accommodations for the “known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” unless the employer 
can show that such measures would cause undue hardship on the business.  Courts 
have historically held that an employee must first request an accommodation before 
an employer can be liable for failure to accommodate.  The Brady court found that 
this rule was inapplicable because Brady’s disability was “obvious or otherwise 
known” to the employer.  The court reasoned that an employer must provide 
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accommodations for an obvious disability because a disabled employee may not 
recognize their need for an accommodation, may not realize they are entitled to one, 
or may be too embarrassed or scared to request one.  This shifts the responsibility of 
initiating the process of providing disability accommodations from the employee to 
the employer.  In sum, the court’s holding states that an employer must provide 
reasonable accommodations if an employee requests an accommodation or if an 
employee’s disability is obvious or otherwise known. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Brady clarifies the responsibilities of 
employers under the ADA.  If an employer is aware of an employee’s disability, the 
employer should not rely upon the employee to request an accommodation and 
should instead offer to provide reasonable accommodations to assist the disabled 
employee in performing the essential functions of his or her job.  Tennessee courts 
have previously followed the old rule requiring employees to request 
accommodations, but have not revisited the issue since the Brady decision.  However, 
in deciding a similar Ohio case only two months after Brady, the Sixth Circuit 
referenced and relied upon the old rule, which places initial responsibility on an 
ADA plaintiff to request accommodations.1  Despite this decision, employers and 
attorneys in the Sixth Circuit should remain aware of the broader duties imposed by 
Brady, which could signal a trend of shifting responsibility of initiating the process of 
providing accommodations from employee to employer.   
The Brady court also recognized the difficulty of addressing whether the Wal-
Mart’s pre-employment inquiries were narrowly tailored to the specific job for which 
Brady was applying.  In refraining from deciding the issue, the court left the question 
open to future controversy.  Guidelines for pre-employment inquiries have yet to be 
expressly defined for employers.  Until that issue is resolved, employers should be 
mindful of the specificity and appropriateness of their pre-employment health 
inquiries. 
――――― 
                                                 
1 See Talley v. Family Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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ESTATE PLANNING 
The one-year statute of  limitations on claims against a decedent’s estate is 
not applicable to claims for TennCare reimbursement because the personal 
representative of  the estate is statutorily obligated to satisfy all claims to 
TennCare before the estate is closed.  In re Estate of  Berchie Cordelia Roberts, No. 
M2006-01950-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348, 2008 WL 2415520 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. June 11, 2008). 
By Roman Hankins 
 Generally, claims against the estate of  a deceased person are subject to a one-
year statute of  limitations from the date of  death under section 30-2-310(a) of  the 
Tennessee Code.  However, certain exceptions to this rule apply, most notably the 
three-year statute of  limitations period in the case of  taxes owed to the state.  In In re 
Estate of  Roberts, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals ruled that claims by the Bureau of  
TennCare (“TennCare”) also are not subject to the one-year statute of  limitations. 
 Berchie Cordelia Roberts, the decedent, enrolled in TennCare and began 
receiving nursing home benefits at the age of  77.  Ms. Roberts died in March 2003, 
after receiving TennCare benefits for approximately six years.  In November 2003, 
TennCare sent a letter and form to Marie Wiser, Ms. Roberts’ caretaker, stating that a 
claim may exist.  Ms. Wiser did not respond to the letter.  TennCare sent a second 
letter in January 2004, which also received no response. 
 In November 2004, Ms. Wiser was appointed personal representative of  Ms. 
Roberts’ estate.  In December, the estate’s attorney sent a copy of  the order opening 
the estate to TennCare, and TennCare then filed a claim to recover $163,237.63 from 
the estate for nursing facility costs paid by TennCare on behalf  of  Ms. Roberts.  In 
January 2005, Ms. Wiser filed an exception to TennCare’s claim on the sole basis that 
the claim had been filed after the statute of  limitations period had run and was 
therefore untimely. 
 The trial court determined that TennCare’s actions in pursuing the claim 
were a governmental function, essentially the same thing as the state’s attempt to 
recover taxes owed.  As such, the claim was not barred by the usual one-year statute 
of  limitations, but it was subject to the longer three-year statute of  limitations for 
state tax claims.  TennCare was awarded the full amount of  its claim, and the estate 
appealed. 
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 On appeal, the Court of  Appeals of  Tennessee held that TennCare was 
entitled to recover the payments, although on different grounds from the trial court.  
The Court agreed that most state claims are governed by the general one-year statute 
of  limitations provided in Tennessee Code Annotated 30-2-310(b) and that certain 
other tax recovery claims are covered by a three-year statute of  limitations.  
However, the court held that neither statute of  limitation is applicable to recovery by 
TennCare. 
 As noted by the court, ensuring that TennCare has recovered any properly 
paid benefits is an obligation of  the personal representative, placed on that person by 
the Tennessee Legislature.  As part of  that obligation, the personal representative 
must show to the probate court either that TennCare has recovered all proper 
payments or that TennCare has given a release to the estate, indicating that the estate 
owes nothing. 
TennCare also has responsibility to recover paid benefits.  Under section 30-
1-301 et seq of  the Tennessee Code, if  no action is taken to open an estate that 
possibly owes recovery to TennCare, TennCare may do so.  Still, this is not an 
affirmative obligation on TennCare, and it is ultimately the personal representative’s 
responsibility to ensure that any claims by TennCare are either satisfied or released 
before the estate may be closed.  Therefore, the one-year statute of  limitations does 
not apply to claims for recovery by TennCare. 
The court also discussed an amendment to TennCare laws made since the 
case was filed.  While not applicable in this case, the changes are noteworthy in that 
they place more explicit responsibility on the personal representative of  an estate to 
notify TennCare and to determine whether the decedent was a TennCare enrollee 
who actually received benefits.1 
As Estate of  Roberts illustrates, TennCare has a right to recovery for any 
medical assistance payments made after the decedent reaches 55 years of  age, 
provided that the decedent left no surviving spouse or child under age 18 or who is 
blind or totally disabled.2  While TennCare also has a responsibility to “strive 
vigorously to recoup any TennCare funds for a decedent during the decedent’s 
lifetime,” the personal representative carries the primary obligation to ensure that 
TennCare is notified and that any claims are satisfied before the estate is closed.3  
                                                 
1 TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-116 (2004 & Supp. 2008) (amended 2007). 
2 Id. § 71-5-116(c)(1). 
3 Id. § 71-5-116(d)(2). 
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Since the 2007 revisions more clearly define a personal representative’s duties, 
probate attorneys are well advised to read these statutes and follow them closely.  
First, TennCare must be notified of  the death by receiving notification from both the 
department of  health (within 30 days) and the personal representative (within 60 
days after receiving letters of  administration or letters testamentary).4  Also, the 
personal representative must file an affidavit confirming notice, notify the court of  
the decedent’s enrollment in TennCare, and send the notice to TennCare.5  Most 
notably, section 71-5-116(c)(2) of  the Tennessee Code now explicitly requires that, 
before an estate may be closed, if  the decedent was enrolled in TennCare at death, 
the personal representative must file with the clerk of  the court a release from 
TennCare showing payment of  amounts due, waiver of  the TennCare’s claims, or a 
statement showing no amount due.  By following this routine process, attorneys will 
save time and money. 
 Estate of  Roberts is just one of  the cases in the ongoing controversy 
surrounding TennCare reimbursement.  A companion case, In re Estate of  Tanner, 
2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757, 2007 WL 4287373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2007), is 
currently on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.  However, while this issue 
remains unsettled, the practicing attorney should follow the statutory requirements as 
interpreted by Estate of  Roberts to ensure proper estate administration and minimize 
the risk to the personal representative. 
The Tennessee Bar Association (“TBA”) has voiced opposition to the Estate 
of  Roberts holding and the underlying statutory amendments to section 71-5-116 of  
the Tennessee Code.6  During legislative negotiations of  those amendments, the 
TBA argued that any time period longer than the standard one-year statute of  
limitations would interfere with the estate’s ability to timely file accurate death tax 
returns.  Furthermore, the TBA has argued that Estate of  Roberts sets a dangerous 
precedent that a personal representative may be personally liable to the estate’s 
reimbursement to TennCare. 
The court’s central holding in Estate of  Roberts is correct.  While the TBA 
raises valid concerns related to potential liability being inappropriately placed upon 
the personal representative, the court’s holding in Estate of  Roberts follows the 
                                                 
4 The form for notification and request for release can be found at http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/ 
forms/releaseform.pdf. 
5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-116(d)(1). 
6 Albert Secor, Estate Administration & Planning Update, TBA Estate Planning Forum 2009 6-7 
(Feb. 27, 2009) (unpublished materials, on file with Transactions:  The Tennessee Journal of Business 
Law). 
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primary objectives of  the relevant statute.  Section 71-5-116 of  the Tennessee Code 
has two primary objectives:  to ensure that TennCare is properly notified of  the 
death of  a possible TennCare enrollee, and to see that TennCare is properly 
reimbursed before the estate is closed.  The statutory language pertaining to the 
latter objective clearly sets the TennCare claim apart from other claims, since not all 
claims (i.e., those falling outside the statute of  limitations) have to be settled before 
the estate may be closed.  Furthermore, this is an issue on which TennCare is not 
likely to give up easily.  Potentially large sums of  money are at stake in this issue, 
which on TennCare’s side consist of  taxpayer dollars.  Thus, the wise attorney will 
always follow the statutory procedure for TennCare claims and ensure that the next 
estate does not end up like that of  Ms. Roberts. 
――――― 
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PROPERTY LAW 
Claims seeking to limit a dominant estate’s use of a prescriptive easement 
must be based on sufficient evidence that the dominant estate’s use has 
materially increased the burden on the servient estate.  Frye v. Presley, No. 
E2007-00510-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372, 2008 WL 2557372 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. June 27, 2008). 
By Sabrina Carlson 
 An easement is a “right an owner has to some lawful use of the real property 
of another.”  A prescriptive easement is established where there is an “uninterrupted, 
open, visible, and exclusive use of another’s property for at least twenty years with 
the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence.”  Upon the establishment of a prescriptive 
easement, a dominant estate that benefits from the easement cannot materially 
increase the burden on the servient estate that is burdened by the easement.  In Frye 
v. Presley, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that (1) the existence of a 
prescriptive easement to use a driveway invalidated a claim of encroachment and (2) 
a servient estate seeking to enjoin activity by a dominant estate must offer sufficient 
evidence that the dominant estate’s activity amounts to a material increase in burden 
to the servient estate. 
 The Presleys and the Fryes own two contiguous tracts of land in Sweetwater, 
Tennessee.  The tracts were purchased in 1970 and 1980, respectively.  The Presley 
tract is accessible solely via a primarily gravel driveway comprised of an old portion 
of State Highway 68.  The driveway runs along the northern and western boundaries 
of the Frye tract before continuing east toward the Presleys’ house.  The driveway is 
no larger than fourteen feet wide where it crosses either the northern or western 
boundary of the Frye tract.   
 Neither the Presleys’ nor the Fryes’ deeds specifically mentioned the 
driveway easement.  Although the Fryes’ deed stated that it is “subject to any visible 
easement,” the first recordation of the driveway easement was in a 1993 conveyance 
of a portion of the Presley tract from the Presleys to their son.  The 1993 deed 
references a thirty-foot wide right-of-way for “ingress to and egress from” the 
Presley tract. 
 In response to increased use of the driveway by the Presleys and their 
children, the Fryes filed a complaint asking the trial court to determine:  (1) whether 
the Presleys possessed a lawful easement to use the driveway; (2) if an easement was 
present, whether the Presleys had increased the scope of their easement resulting in 
encroachment; and (3) whether the Presleys had unlawfully installed utility lines on 
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the Fryes property.  The trial court held: (1) that the Presleys possessed a fourteen-
foot “right-of-way easement” to use the northern portion of the driveway, and lawful 
use of the northern portion of the driveway did not constitute encroachment; 
however (2) the Presleys did not possess an easement to use the western portion of 
the driveway, and together with the unlawful installation of utility lines, the uses 
presented an unreasonable increase in burden to the Fryes property, constituting 
encroachment.  
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee examined two issues:  (1) 
whether the trial court erred in granting the Presleys an easement to use the northern 
portion of the driveway and denying the Presleys an easement to use the Western 
portion of the driveway and (2) whether the evidence preponderated against the trial 
court’s finding that the Presleys’ use of the driveway unlawfully encroached upon the 
western portion of the Fryes’ land, resulting in an unreasonable increase in burden to 
the Fryes’ property.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in part and 
reversed in part, holding (1) that the Presleys had a prescriptive easement to use both 
the northern and western portions of the driveway and (2) that the increased traffic 
and installation of utility lines on the western portion of the driveway was not an 
unreasonable increase in burden to the Fryes’ property beyond the use permitted by 
the Presleys’ prescriptive easement.  
 The court held that there was a prescriptive easement over the entire 
driveway because of the Presleys’ “uninterrupted, open, visible, and exclusive use” of 
the driveway, under an adverse claim of right to the Fryes’ real property, for at least 
twenty years, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Fryes.  , The driveway had 
been used as the only means of access to the Presley tract since 1970.  The Fryes 
testified that they were aware of the driveway when they purchased their tract in 
1980, and that they knew their deed was “subject to all prior easement[s], rights of 
way, and restrictions, visible and otherwise.” 
 Although the Fryes argued that the Presleys had expanded the driveway on 
the Fryes’ property, the court held that the evidence preponderated against such a 
finding of fact.  The Fryes also argued that increased use of the driveway by 
approximately fifteen vehicles had resulted in an increase in burden to their property 
due to increased traffic, a “nuisance of dust,” and “rock slinging.”  Citing Adams v. 
Winnett, the court stated:  “[T]he owner of an easement ‘cannot materially increase 
the burden of it upon the servient estate or impose thereon a new and additional 
burden.’”  Adams v. Winnett, 156 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941). 
 The holding in Frye, through its affirmation of the Adams decision, illustrates 
how the existence of a prescriptive easement may negate a servient estate’s claim of 
encroachment against a dominant estate, and how a servient estate seeking to enjoin 
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activity by a dominant estate must offer sufficient evidence that the dominant 
estate’s activity amounts to a material increase in burden to the servient estate. 
Transactional lawyers should advise their clients that in Tennessee, 
encroachment claims against a defendant who holds a prescriptive easement must be 
based on a provable, material increase in burden to the plaintiff’s estate.  Frye 
illustrates that Tennessee courts will consider easement descriptions contained in 
property deeds and other recorded documents to determine whether an easement 
holder has materially increased the burden on the servient estate.  Therefore, it is 
important that easements are recorded, and that the recordings are meticulously 
drafted to exactly and comprehensively describe the easements. 
―――――
The death of  a joint tenant with right of  survivorship extinguishes a pending 
suit for partition of  real property.  Rusnak v. Phebus, No. M2007-01592-COA-R9-
CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328, 2008 WL 2229514 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2008). 
By Bryan C. Hathorn 
In Rusnak v. Phebus, a plaintiff filed suit to partition real property held in joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship.  After the suit was filed, but before final judgment 
in the case, one of the joint tenants died.  The court held that by operation of law, 
the death of a joint tenant with right of survivorship abates a pending suit for 
partition of real property. 
The defendant’s mother was in poor health and the defendant admitted her 
to a nursing home.  The defendant’s mother had previously executed a durable 
power of attorney in favor of the defendant.  The defendant’s mother had assets that 
were sufficient to prevent her from qualifying for Medicaid.  In an attempt to deplete 
her mother’s assets to qualify her mother for benefits, the defendant used the power 
of attorney to sell her mother a 45% share in a condominium.  The defendant and 
her mother took title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. 
Ultimately, the defendant’s mother was ineligible for Medicaid.  The 
defendant had stopped making payments to the nursing home on her mother’s 
behalf, and the nursing home petitioned the court to have a conservator appointed.  
The court found that the condominium transaction and the defendant’s failure to 
pay her mother’s nursing home payments warranted appointment of a conservator.  
The court appointed Mr. Rusnak as conservator and terminated the defendant’s 
durable power of attorney. 
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The conservator filed notice with the defendant of his intention to file suit 
for partition of the condominium.  The complaint for partition was filed and the 
defendant’s mother died approximately three weeks later.  The defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss, asserting that the undivided title in the condominium passed to 
her by operation of law at the death of her mother.  The conservator’s response cited 
section 34-3-108(e) of the Tennessee Code, which grants the conservator of the 
estate 120 days after the ward’s death to wind up the estate.  Further, the conservator 
cited section 20-5-101 of the Tennessee Code, which holds that pending suits “do 
not abate by the death, or other disability of either party . . . if the cause of action 
survives or continues.”   
The nursing home filed a motion to intervene in the action in order to 
pursue its claim for payment against the estate.  The nursing home did not file an 
intervening complaint.  The court granted the motion to intervene, denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the conservator—who was appointed as 
administrator of the estate—filed a motion to intervene in the suit as a party plaintiff 
in his role as administrator.  The court found for the plaintiff and ordered the sale of 
the property.  The defendant appealed the judgment and the sale of the property was 
stayed pending resolution of the appeal. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and held that the suit 
for partition did not survive the death of the joint tenant.  The basis for the decision 
was that a suit for partition does not sever a joint tenancy until final judgment is 
reached.  Consequently, the death of the joint tenant while the suit is pending vests 
title exclusively in the surviving tenant or tenants by operation of law. 
The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s position that the suit was preserved 
by the language of section 20-5-101 of the Tennessee Code, which preserves an 
action at death or disability of a party “if the cause of action survives or continues.”  
The court found that the phrase “if the cause of action survives or continues” is not 
applicable in a case involving partition of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship 
because, under the majority rule, the cause of action does not survive.   
In the alternative, the plaintiff relied on section 20-5-102 of the Tennessee 
Code, which provides that an action founded upon wrongs or contracts of the 
defendant does not abate upon the death of either party.  In the instant case, the suit 
was for a partition of the property and the pleadings did not allege any wrongful act 
of the defendant.  While the court recognized that the condominium transaction 
appeared on its face to be self-serving and the facts suggest the transaction may have 
resulted from undue influence or a fraudulent conveyance, these claims were not in 
the pleadings.  By filing a motion to intervene, rather than an intervening complaint 
alleging wrongdoing, the nursing home was bound to the original pleadings.  With 
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no complaints alleging wrongdoing, the court held that section 20-5-102 of the 
Tennessee Code was not implicated.  Because there was no alleged wrongdoing, the 
suit for partition abated upon death of the joint tenant. 
The present case illustrates two major points.  First, it demonstrates that it is 
frequently better to file an intervening complaint rather than to intervene by motion.  
The nursing home, which intervened by motion, was tied to the pleadings made by 
Rusnak.  Those pleadings did not include claims alleging wrongdoing by the 
defendant. 
Second, it is imperative to use due care when making pleadings in a case 
involving property held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship.  In a suit which 
could abate upon death of a party, it is essential to plead causes of action which 
result from wrongs of the defendant if the facts support them.  In the present case, 
no cause of action based on wrongful conduct of the defendant was alleged in the 
complaint.  As such, section 20-5-102 of the Tennessee Code could not be 
implicated to save the suit.1 
This case resolved an issue of first impression in the state of Tennessee, 
brought Tennessee into accord with the vast majority of states.  Tennessee has now 
adopted the rule that a death by a joint tenant terminates a pending suit for partition 
of a property when no misconduct is alleged and vests title in the surviving tenants 
by operation of law.  The basis for this decision is sound in that it protects the 
integrity survivorship interests in joint estates, yet preserves an exception when 
misconduct is alleged. 
――――― 
  
                                                 
1 However, in the present case, the motion to dismiss was a responsive pleading, but a motion to 
amend the complaint to add the cause of action based on a fraudulent conveyance would serve the 
interest of justice.  Had a motion to amend the complaint to include the claims alleging wrongful 
conduct been granted by the court, the suit would have been preserved by implicating Tennessee 
Code Annotated § 20-5-102. 
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Reference to a description of land in a plat book is sufficient to allege color of 
title to satisfy the requirements of an adverse possession claim.  Underwood 
Repair Service, Inc. v. Dean, No. M2006-01367-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
354, 2008 WL 2466270 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2008).   
By Drew Oldham 
In order to assert a claim for adverse possession, the plaintiff must allege 
“exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open and notorious possession for the entire 
prescriptive period under claim of right thereto.”  In Tennessee, the prescriptive 
period for adverse possession is seven years, for which a plaintiff may “tack on” a 
previous owner’s period of ownership if he sufficiently alleges “color of title.”  
Where a plaintiff asserts ownership over a strip of land via adverse possession, the 
plaintiff’s inclusion of a deed which merely references a description of the strip in a 
plat book satisfies the requirements for alleging “color of title.”  The Tennessee 
Court of Appeals reached this conclusion in Underwood Repair Service v. Dean. 
In Underwood, William Underwood purchased a lot from Jesse Wright on July 
30, 1999.  Underwood’s company, Underwood Repair Service, subsequently 
purchased the lot from Underwood.  Billy Dean, Peggy Dean, and Dean, LLP 
(collectively, “the Deans”) owned a lot adjacent to Underwood’s lot.  The previous 
owner of Underwood’s lot, Jesse Wright, fenced in a strip of land located between 
the two lots and used the strip of land in his business for a number of years.  The 
strip of land was originally part of the lot owned by the Deans. 
On February 22, 2005, Underwood filed a complaint alleging that he owned 
the strip of land in fee simple, or in the alternative, that he obtained possession of 
the land via adverse possession pursuant to section 28-2-101 of the Tennessee Code.  
The warranty deed attached to the complaint contained the following description:  
“Land in Davidson County, Tennessee, being Lot No. 1 on the Plan of Antioch 
Commercial P.U.D. Section One of record in Plat Book 5190, page 734, Register’s 
Office for said County, to which reference is made for a more complete 
description.”   
In response to the complaint, the Deans filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that Underwood failed to properly allege “color of title” to the disputed strip of land 
and, thus, the adverse possession claim should be dismissed.  In order to meet the 
requisite seven-year period required to establish “color of title,” Underwood would 
need to “tack on” Wright’s period of ownership, which (although not specifically 
disclosed in the opinion) would extend the period of adverse possession beyond the 
seven-year period.  The trial court granted the Deans’ motion to dismiss, finding that 
the attached warranty deed, without further reference, did not sufficiently allege 
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“color of title.” Therefore, Wright’s period of ownership could not be tacked on to 
Underwood’s period of ownership in order for Underwood to reach the seven-year 
period required for an adverse possession claim.  Essentially, the trial court 
determined that the facts alleged in the complaint failed as a matter of law to satisfy 
Tennessee’s adverse possession statute, section 28-2-101. 
On appeal, the court considered whether the complaint and attachments, 
including the warranty deed, sufficiently alleged Underwood’s “color of title” to 
allow Underwood to tack on Wright’s period of ownership.  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court has held that the essential requirements for adverse possession are “exclusive, 
actual, adverse, continuous, open and notorious possession for the [seven-year] 
prescriptive period under claim of right thereto.”  On a motion to dismiss, the 
defendant admits the truth of all relevant and material averments in the complaint 
but asserts that the statements do not constitute a cause of action.  In Underwood, the 
Deans’ motion asserted that while all of the other requirements of adverse 
possession were satisfied, the complaint did not sufficiently allege “color of title” 
such to meet the seven-year requirement and, thus, the complaint did not sufficiently 
allege a valid cause of action. 
The court stated that a party may tack on the previous owner’s period of 
ownership to reach the seven-year requirement so long as the previous owner, as 
adverse possessor, intended to and actually did turn over possession of the land.  As 
the deed demonstrates that Wright intended to “turn over” Lot No. 1, presumably 
including the fenced-in portion, the court concluded that Underwood could tack on 
the Wright’s period of ownership if the deed in fact conveyed “color of title” to the 
strip of land at issue.  The court referenced Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 
S.W.3d 366, 377 (Tenn. 2007), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court defined 
“color of title” as “something in writing which at face value, professes to pass title 
but which does not do it, either for want of title in the person making it or from the 
defective mode of the conveyance that is used.”  The court looked next to Slatton v. 
Tennessee Coal, Iron and Rail Company, 75 S.W. 926, 927 (Tenn. 1902), in which the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a person “holds constructive possession of the 
whole tract only when his entry was under color of title by specific boundaries to the 
whole tract.”  The Supreme Court also stated that “[t]he first requisite of such color 
of title as will give constructive possession to the claimant is, therefore, some definite 
description showing the extent of the claim.”  The Underwood court therefore asked 
whether the description in the deed was “some definite description showing the 
extent of the claim.”  The court concluded that, as a matter of law, Underwood’s 
description was of sufficient definiteness to convey color of title to the strip of land 
in question because it referenced the plat book that must be presumed to contain a 
further description that includes the land in issue.  As a final note, the court stated 
that it reached this conclusion because it must construe the complaint liberally in 
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favor of the plaintiff, taking all allegations of fact therein as true.  Therefore, while 
the description is sufficient to allege a claim for adverse possession, on remand, the 
trial court may determine that such description may not be sufficient to be successful on 
such a claim. 
The Underwood case illustrates the necessity for drafters to fully and 
completely describe conveyances in deeds and other documents of transfer.  In the 
event that a client wishes to assert a claim for adverse possession at a future date, 
such a description of the land is a necessary aspect to satisfying the requirements for 
“color of title.”  Without being able to establish “color of title,” a claim to property 
based on adverse possession would fail unless the twenty-year period under common 
law has been met, which is rarely the case.  While the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
construed the deed in this case liberally in favor of the plaintiff, the court could have 
reached a different outcome under these facts.  As such, this case reinforces the 
importance of careful drafting. 
――――― 
Requirements for the release of  a deed of  trust that are part of  the public 
record provide constructive knowledge to the entire world, which will prevent 
claims of  equitable estoppel.  Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. v. ORNL Federal Credit 
Union, No. E2007-02421-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360, 2008 WL 
2510587 (2008). 
By Walter Siedentopf 
In Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. v. ORNL Federal Credit Union, the Court of  
Appeals of  Tennessee considered whether a senior lender can be equitably estopped 
from asserting its deed of  trust when a junior lender pays the loan in full but has 
knowledge of  conditions required, beyond mere payment, for the release of  the deed 
of  trust.  The court also provided dicta analyzing the same question under slightly 
altered fact patterns, which yielded different results under the equitable estoppel 
doctrine. 
David and Donna Lockett (“Borrowers”) took out $100,000 on a home 
equity line of  credit from ORNL Federal Credit Union (“ORNL”) secured by a deed 
of  trust on the Borrowers’ Loudon County home.  The deed provided that “[w]hen 
borrower (1) has paid all sums secured by this Deed of  Trust and (2) has requested 
that the revolving line of  credit be canceled, Lender shall release this deed of  trust.” 
ORNL properly recorded the deed, including the foregoing language, with the 
register of  deeds. 
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Almost a year later, Borrowers refinanced the loan with TNBank.  They 
signed a promissory note for $127,000, and they secured this debt with a second 
deed of  trust on their home.  TNBank, through its title company, Jackson Square 
Title Company (“Jackson Square”), and Jackson Square’s attorney, requested a 
statement of  the current payoff  amount from ORNL.  ORNL returned two 
statements, showing a total debt of  $100,468.43, but failed to provide its normal 
notice that the borrowers needed to request the closure of  their line of  credit before 
the deed of  trust would be released.   
In response to the statements of  debt, Jackson Square issued two checks to 
ORNL totaling the full amount of  the debt, and ORNL returned receipt vouchers to 
TNBank acknowledging that the debts had been paid in full.  A week later, TNBank 
recorded its own deed of  trust and assigned it, along with the Borrowers’ debt, to 
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (“Washington Mutual”).  ORNL never closed the 
Borrowers’ line of  credit or released the deed of  trust securing it.   
Approximately two weeks later, the Borrowers began drawing more money 
from the original line of  credit with ORNL.  Over the next year and a half, the 
Borrowers borrowed an additional $95,887.87 from ORNL, all secured by ORNL’s 
original deed of  trust on the Borrowers’ home.  Some time after this, the Borrowers 
began to default on the loan payments, and Washington Mutual and Jackson Square 
became aware that ORNL had not released its senior deed of  trust. 
Jackson Square requested that ORNL release its deed of  trust.  ORNL did 
not respond to the requests, and instead, it began foreclosure proceedings on the 
Borrowers’ home.  Washington Mutual then filed a complaint against ORNL and 
requested that the foreclosure proceedings be enjoined.  Before the trial court came 
to a decision, the two companies agreed to a foreclosure sale and placed the 
proceeds, $108,293.09, in escrow pending the trial court’s decision. 
Equitable estoppel is governed by section 66-26-105 of  the Tennessee Code, 
but the court relied upon a Tennessee Supreme Court case, Osborne v. Mountain Life 
Insurance Co., 130 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Tenn. 2004), for the interpretation of  the 
equitable estoppel doctrine.  This interpretation of  equitable estoppel has six 
elements:  First, with respect to the party being estopped, there must be (1) a false 
representation or “concealment of  material facts, or at least which is calculated to 
convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those 
which the party subsequently attempts to assert;” (2) intention that the  
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representation will be acted upon; and (3) knowledge of  the real facts.  Second, with 
respect to the party asserting estoppel, there must be (4) a “lack of  knowledge and 
of  the means of  knowledge of  the truth as to the facts in question;” (5) reliance 
upon the representation; and (6) action that prejudicially changes the asserting party’s 
position. 
The trial court held that ORNL could not enforce its deed of  trust on the 
theory of  equitable estoppel.  ORNL had a business practice of  providing notice of  
additional requirements for the release of  a deed of  trust to any party requesting a 
loan payoff.  When ORNL failed to comply with this internal procedure, it made a 
false representation to TNBank, which led the trial court to its equitable estoppel 
holding. 
The court of  appeals agreed, in principle, with the trial court’s analysis of  the 
case, but it held that the trial court erred in not properly considering whether 
TNBank and Jackson Square had constructive knowledge of  the additional 
requirements for release.  The deed of  trust, including a statement of  all conditions 
for its release, was on file in the public record, and all parties involved had the 
opportunity to inspect it.  Additionally, section 66-26-102 of  the Tennessee Code 
states that the recording of  a deed of  trust provides notice to “all the world” of  the 
deed and its contents.  Finally, TNBank’s own deed of  trust contained a similar 
provision requiring more than mere payment for release, and thus, TNBank and 
Jackson Square had an even higher duty to inquire about such requirements due to 
the heightened foreseeability of  other companies using similar practices.  For the 
foregoing reasons, the Court held that Washington Mutual had “failed to prove that 
Jackson Square and TNBank lacked ‘the means of  knowledge of  the truth as to the 
facts in question.’”  Therefore, the doctrine of  equitable estoppel was inapplicable in 
this case, and the appellate court overturned the trial court’s decision. 
The Court also considered two other alternate fact sets that, although dicta, 
could provide valuable insight for similar cases or for the application of  the equitable 
estoppel doctrine generally.  First, the court stated that if  there were no facts 
showing knowledge on the part of  TNBank and Jackson Square, the trial court’s 
decisions would have been correct.  Thus, if  the additional conditions to release were 
not part of  the public record and there was no other knowledge—constructive or 
actual—of  such conditions, then failure to give notice and follow internal procedures 
would give rise to a claim of  equitable estoppel. 
Second, the court considered an argument made by Washington Mutual 
based on a Tennessee Supreme Court case, Bennett v. Trevecca Nazarene University., 216 
S.W.3d 293 (Tenn. 2007).  In this case, a university told an electrician that some of  
the equipment he was working on was low voltage when, in fact, the university knew 
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that the equipment carried high voltage.  By giving the electrician false information, 
the university was subjected to liability when the electrician was injured.  The Court 
said that Bennett stands for the proposition that, while there is no duty to inform 
about certain dangers, if  one chooses to do so, such communications will be 
subjected to a duty to speak truthfully.  The court found Bennett to be inapplicable to 
the current set of  facts because ORNL remained silent about any additional 
requirements.  The court stated, however, that the Bennett ruling “would be relevant” 
if  ORNL had falsely informed Jackson Square that there were no other requirements 
or if  ORNL had stated that the deed would be released anyway.  The court’s 
language leaves the outcome of  such a case uncertain. 
In general, this case shows that courts will afford a great deal of  deference to 
documents that have been properly filed and made a part of  the public record.  Such 
documents provide notice to the world of  their contents, and courts will not be 
forgiving to those who fail to read such documents carefully.  Further, this case 
accents the need for careful practice on the part of  all parties when dealing with real 
estate documents.  Litigation could have been avoided if  ORNL had properly 
followed its own procedures or if  Jackson Square’s attorney had read the deed of  
trust more carefully.  For the refinancing bank, this case shows the importance of  
requesting all information from the original lender and carefully reading the 
documents that are provided or that are on record.  For the original lender, this case 
shows the importance of  documenting everything possible in the public record. 
――――― 
Land developers seeking to impose restrictive covenants must clearly express 
those intended covenants within each deed.  Massey v. R.W. Graf, Inc., No. E2007-
02474-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367, 2008 WL 2557362 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. June 26, 2008). 
By Scott E. Simmons 
 To advance the unrestricted use of  property by a landowner, any doubt 
concerning the applicability of  a restrictive covenant to a piece of  real property must 
be resolved against that restriction.  Similarly, any ambiguity in the terms of  such a 
covenant shall be resolved against that restriction.  A developer seeking to impose a 
restrictive covenant on a parcel of  land must expressly and unambiguously convey 
such intentions when drafting the covenant. 
 In Massey v. R.W. Graf, Inc., a group of  homeowners in the Deanbrook 
subdivision (“Plaintiffs”) brought a declaratory judgment action against adjacent 
property owners (“Defendants”).  More specifically, Plaintiffs sought a declaration 
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that building restrictions on platted parcels of  property received from a common 
grantor also applied to a non-platted parcel purchased by Defendants from a 
subsequent grantor. 
 Plaintiffs were subject to a restrictive covenant expressly recorded by the 
original developer (“Dean”) of  the subdivision that limited further development of  
the land in the subdivision.  Subsequent to the enactment of  this covenant, Dean’s 
estate conveyed certain portions of  the subdivision, as well as property outside the 
subdivision that included the property now owned by Defendants, to the University 
of  Tennessee via warranty deed.  This conveyance was guided by a restrictive 
covenant, which read in pertinent part that “[t]his conveyance . . . is made subject to 
Restrictive Covenants applicable to all of  the lots located in the Deanbrook Sub-
divisions . . . .”  This conveyance included land originally within the Deanbrook 
subdivision, but it also included an undivided 30-acre parcel that was never a part of  
the subdivision.  Defendant Graf  later purchased this 30-acre plat from the 
university for development, selling individual lots to prospective homeowners, who 
were named as defendants only as necessary parties to the litigation.  
 Following a hearing on Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment, 
the trial judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, holding that the “subject 
to” language of  the covenant was ambiguous.  The court noted it was well-
established law that any ambiguity in the terms of  a covenant or intent of  the parties 
will be resolved against the restriction.  Further, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
alternative contention that Dean’s original conveyance to the university created an 
implied negative reciprocal easement burdening Defendants’ property, holding that 
for such a doctrine to apply, there must have been evidence Dean had intent to 
create a general development plan for the entire original tract.  
  On appeal, Plaintiffs averred two counts of  error, first challenging the trial 
court’s determination that the language in the restriction was ambiguous, and second, 
challenging the court’s finding that no implied negative reciprocal easement had 
arisen in Plaintiffs’ favor.   
 Upon review, the Court of  Appeals of  Tennessee first upheld the trial court’s 
determination that the language within the restrictive covenant was ambiguous, 
noting that it “[was] susceptible to two very different meanings.  It could mean that 
[it] applies to all of  the property conveyed . . . including the Graf  property.  Or it 
could mean that the Dean estate intended to have the reference restrictive covenants 
apply only to the lots within the Deanbrook subdivision . . . .”   
 In justifying its determination, the court relied upon a bevy of  case law 
opposing restrictive covenants.  The court cited Williams v. Fox, 219 S.W.3d 319, 324 
288 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 10
 
(Tenn. 2007), holding that because restrictive covenants are in derogation of  the 
fundamental right of  free use and enjoyment of  real property, they are not favored 
under Tennessee law.  Similarly, Parks v. Richardson, 567 S.W.2d 465, 467-68 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1977), set forth the proposition that any ambiguity in the terms of  a restrictive 
covenant will be resolved against the restriction.  The court succinctly differentiated 
between two types of  ambiguity:  the first type of  ambiguity arises from “general” 
doubt or uncertainty, while the second arises from the “possibility of  the same 
language being fairly understood in more ways than one.”  The court relied on the 
second type when it determined that the language of  the restrictive covenant was 
ambiguous. 
 The appellate court also upheld the finding that no implied negative 
reciprocal easement had arisen.  Such an easement arises when a property owner sells 
off  parcels of  a tract to different persons, including a restrictive covenant in the 
deeds for the benefit not only of  the property owner who is purchasing the parcel, 
but also for others who buy separate portions of  the tract.  In such an instance, each 
purchaser does not acquire absolute and unqualified title to his or her respective 
parcel, but rather title limited by restrictions within the deed. 
 To equitably enforce a negative reciprocal easement, the purchaser must first 
pass a four-part test: (1) the parties derived their titles from a common grantor; (2) 
the common grantor had a general plan for the property involved; (3) the common 
grantor intended for the restrictive covenant to benefit the property involved; and (4) 
the grantees had actual or constructive knowledge of  the restriction when they 
purchased their parcels.  In line with this theory, the court of  appeals determined 
that Dean did not have a general plan or scheme of  development for the portion of  
the land owned by Defendants.  In furtherance of  its determination, the court 
showed that the properties originally adjacent to the Dean subdivision (a) were not 
platted and (b) were not expressly included in the recorded restriction. 
 As Massey demonstrates, restrictive covenants within a subdivision should be 
drafted carefully and unambiguously to express the clear intentions of  the drafting 
party.  More specifically, if  a transactional attorney representing a developer seeks to 
impose a restrictive covenant on the homeowners within a subdivision, the scope 
and extent of  the restriction must be clearly expressed within each deed. 
――――― 
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TENNESSEE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act can apply to the entrepreneurial, 
commercial, or business aspects of  a medical practice.  Proctor v. Chattanooga 
Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 270 S.W.3d 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
By Bradley J. Hearne 
In Proctor, the Court of  Appeals of  Tennessee considered the issue of  
whether the business aspects of  a medical practice are subject to the provisions of  
the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).  The court held that the TCPA 
can apply to the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspects of  a medical 
practice. 
The plaintiff  was a patient of  a physician affiliated with the defendant 
orthopedic center.  The physician performed, among other medical procedures, 
surgeries on each of  the plaintiff ’s shoulders.  Due to further health complications, 
the plaintiff  was scheduled to have another surgery on his shoulder.  Prior to the 
plaintiff ’s subsequent shoulder surgery, the plaintiff ’s physician disassociated himself  
from the orthopedic center.  Another physician, who was associated with the center, 
performed the later surgery.  After the completion of  the surgery, the center billed 
the plaintiff  and his insurer for a total shoulder arthroplasty.  However, the center’s 
physician actually conducted a less expensive form of  surgery known as a hemi-
arthroplasty. 
The plaintiff  and his wife then sued the center, alleging violations of  the 
TCPA resulting from the center billing for a surgery that was not performed.  The 
Circuit Court dismissed the complaint and the plaintiff  appealed.  One issue was 
raised on appeal:  whether the trial court erred in holding that the business aspects 
of  the center’s medical practice were not subject to the provisions of  the TCPA and 
dismissing the complaint. 
Construing the complaint liberally in favor of  the plaintiff, the appellate 
court held that the plaintiff  stated a claim for alleged deceptive business practices 
upon which relief  could be granted.  Given the intent of  the Tennessee General 
Assembly, along with case law, the center was not exempt from the TCPA because 
the alleged violations applied to the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspects 
of  a medical practice. 
In particular, the court distinguished this case from Constant v. Wyeth, 352 F. 
Supp. 2d 847 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).  On appeal, the center had cited Constant in support 
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of  the proposition that the TCPA does not apply to the provision of  medical 
services.  The Constant court found that the plaintiff  had alleged a claim for medical 
malpractice and then alleged simply that the doctor had violated the TCPA “with no 
other ‘fleshing out’ of  this allegation.”  The Constant court then stated that “medical 
malpractice claims may not be recast as consumer protection act claims.”  In Proctor, 
however, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the gravamen of  the 
plaintiffs’ claim sounded in alleged deceptive business practices under the TCPA, not 
in medical malpractice. 
The significance of  the Proctor court’s holding is that the TCPA presents an 
avenue to establishing physician and medical practice liability outside of  a 
malpractice action.  This sidesteps the various hurdles of  a malpractice action 
including enhanced notice requirements, certificates of  good faith, and expert 
testimony.  Additionally, the TCPA allows the patient to recover actual damages, plus 
punitive damages or treble damages, plus attorney’s fees.  Finally, claims under the 
TCPA might not be covered by professional liability insurance because these claims 
arguably involve some aspect of  the business relationship rather than the 
performance of  professional services.  In consequence, medical practices should 
review their general liability insurance policy to ensure that coverage exists for TCPA 
claims. 
――――― 
